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‘‘generally’’ regressive health care financing arrange-
ments, where the poor bear higher relative shares of
the health care cost compared to the most wealthy. Re-
forms aiming at increasing efficiency in utilizing lim-
ited health care resources should therefore address the
issues of equity as an integral part of any future policy
(Gwatkin, 2001). Unfortunately, empirical evidence
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the current health care financing mechanisms in devel-
oping countries remains sparse (Cisse´, Luchini, &
Moatti, 2007). In addition, standard measures of equity
may not be fully appropriate to inform the complex de-
bates involved in health reforms, mainly in the context
of developing countries.
Equity implications of various forms of financing on
prevalent income distribution are commonly summa-
rized over the entire range of income distribution of
population either through assessing aggregate deviations
of a payment schedule away from proportionality e
e.g., Kakwani index of progressivity (KPI) (Kakwani,
1977) e or through assessing aggregate deviations of
a post-payment income distribution away from pre-
payment income distribution e e.g., Reynolds-Smolen-
sky index of redistribution (RS) (Reynolds & Smolensky,
1977). Such two indices are derived from transforma-
tions between the Lorenz and the associated concentra-
tion curves, and are generally referred to as aggregate
summary indices (Lambert, 1993). They have been ex-
tensively deployed in the literature about inequality in
health financing (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2000).
Applied to health care financing, the two indices (KPI
and RS) are related to the normative notion of ‘‘unequal
treatment of unequals’’, and serve to assess respectively
how health care is financed according to abilities-to-pay
(ATP)e a measure of vertical (equity) effect (VE)e and
the extent to which such financing are associated with
(dis)equalizing effect on prevalent income distribution
overall e a measure of overall redistributive effect
(RE). Features of these indices are that they provide
a single-valued measure of inequality and that inequal-
ity is measured at a population level (Clarke, Gerdtham,
& Connelly, 2003). A practical advantage of such
aggregate measures is that they ‘‘enable comparisons
to be performed both across counties and across financ-
ing sources’’ (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 1992).
Despite their convenient cardinal representation, an
exclusive reliance on such aggregate summary indices
may not reveal the actual burden of health care payments
across different income groups. As stated by Klavus
(2001): ‘‘while the inequality assessment given by the
summary measure.would not be incorrect.it would
certainly yield an imperfect description of the nature of
inequality prevailing in the distribution’’. Such limita-
tion may be particularly problematic in the context of
developing countries. This is because discrepancies in
living standards among different socioeconomic classes
of the population represent the common trend, and
where out-of-pocket health expenditures predominate.
Using a single-value index cannot, therefore, tell us iffor instance the observed week (or insignificant) regres-
sivity identified at the aggregate level was due to low ex-
penditures at low-income levels, or if the observed
progressivity identified overall was due to high propor-
tions of incomes spent on health care by the better-off
than the poor (Wagstaff, 2002). Consequently, a more
revealing analysis may require going beyond aggregate
summary indices to assess prevailing inequalities at a dis-
aggregate level. A disaggregate approach, which has
been previously explored in the literature about inequal-
ity measurement in health care financing (e.g., Klavus,
2001) can lend itself better to such interpretation. While
involving actual estimations of relative health burdens at
various levels of aggregation, such approach allows
identifying the magnitude and significance of distribu-
tional outcome at each of these levels, using the domi-
nance criterion framework. The latter involves using
‘‘appropriate’’ statistical inference for testing domi-
nance relationships e i.e. whether there is a significant
difference e between two distributions (Bishop,
Chow, & Formby, 1994).
Indeed, another limitation of previous studies on the
impact of health care financing on income distribution,
which may fuel unnecessary misinterpretations and
controversies in the policy debates, is related to the
fact that most of these studies have rarely assessed
the statistical significance of inequality measures, using
appropriate inferential techniques (Mills & Zandvakili,
1997). Constructing appropriate procedures to testing
for inequality dominance represents, however, a major
challenge (Davidson & Duclos, 2006). Specifically,
one needs to address key issues related to the particular
nature of statistical properties of inequality measures,
their sampling distributions, the presence of correlation
in dataset (e.g., dependent distributions coming from
a single sample), the presence and impact of outliers
(e.g., heavy-tailed distributions), as well as accounting
for complex sampling designs from which the data are
drawn. Two types of statistical inference have been de-
veloped in the literature, based on the asymptotic and
bootstrap (BTS) methods (Davidson & Flachaire,
2007). The very few studies that incorporated such at-
tempts in the specific area of health care financing
(e.g., Cisse´ et al., 2007; Klavus, 2001) resorted to the
asymptotic method. However, compared with asymp-
totic inference, statistical inference for inequality mea-
sures based on bootstrap methods can lead to more
subtle results (Biewen, 2002; Davidson & Flachaire,
2007). Contrary to the asymptotic method, an advan-
tage of bootstrap method is that it allows incorporating
the correlation structures existing in the dataset, while
no complex composition of covariance structure is
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method. Besides, allowing us to take into account com-
plex multi-stage sampling designs, as well as sample
weights, non-parametric testing based on the bootstrap
method takes into account the specific bounds of the
inequality measures. Bootstrap test for inequality mea-
sures may, therefore, provide improved reliability of
statistical inference compared with the asymptotic tests
so far used in the literature (Andres & Calonge, 2005).
This paper attempts to apply the above methodolog-
ical advances to the specific domain of health care
financing, and to elucidate the extent to which these
methods can help clarifying the debates about health
care policies in the context of developing countries e
using the case of the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
The financing structure of health care in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory is expected to be associated with
a major risk of exacerbation of inequalities due to
the lack of a universal system of health care financing,
and because a substantial share of health care expendi-
tures is funded through households’ out-of-pocket
payments (PCBS, 2006a). In addition, the chronic po-
litical crisis in the region, which has brutally increased
poverty, and the lack of adequate and effective tax po-
lices, raise serious concerns about equity in health care.
Despite this idiosyncrasy, the analysis presented in this
paper develops methodological tools suitable for
assessing inequalities in other countries. Using the
bootstrap inference methods demonstrates how the
approach being applied in the context of dependent
distributions can provide a criterion for making rigours
inequality comparisons. The remainder of the paper is
organized as follows. The section The Palestinian
health care system outlines the institutional details
necessary to understand the specific health care system
under consideration. Methodology presents the meth-
odology used to measure the redistributive and vertical
effects. This is followed by outlining the bootstrap
method. The dataset and variable definitions are also
presented in this section. Results are reported after
this section. The last two sections contain some
Discussion and Conclusions.
The Palestinian health care system
The evolution of the Palestinian health system has
been largely shaped by the country’s complex political
history. The two regions of the Occupied Palestinian
Territory: the West Bank (WB) and Gaza Strip (GS)
have been continuously subject to different organiza-
tional structures imposed by their diverse geopolitical
and historical contexts. This is in addition to theirdissimilar demographic and socioeconomic characteris-
tics. Since the establishment of the Palestinian Author-
ity (PA) in 1994, attempts were made to unify the
organizational structures of the two geographically iso-
lated health systems. Today, these initiatives are unable
to erase 27 years of separation during which the WB
followed the Jordanian rules while GS was ruled by
Egypt (Giacaman, Abdul-Rahim, & Wick, 2003). In
general, health care delivery is structured into three-
tiered pyramidal levels, with primary health care at
the bottom, secondary and tertiary care at the middle
and top levels, respectively. Health care services at
almost all three tiers are provided by four actors: the
Ministry of health (MoH), a group of Palestinian non-
governmental organization (PNGOs), the United
Nations Relief and Welfare Agency (UNRWA), and
the Private sector. In terms of delivery of care, 46.1%
of total health care visits take place at MoH institutions
(of which 67% made by households belonging to the
lower half of income deciles), 21.4% at the Private sec-
tor, while the remainder is shared between UNRWA and
PNGOs in the ratio of 60:40, respectively. On average,
out-of-pocket payments amounted to 5.4 USD at the
MoH; 43.5 USD at the private sector; and 32.3 USD
at PNGOs (PCBS, 2004). Annual total health care
expenditure was estimated at about 266 million USD
in 2004, indicating a per capita health expenditure of
73 USD (PCBS, 2006a).
The finance for health care usually comes from the
government (about 35.2% supported by MoH), the pri-
vate sector (40.5% through out-of-pocket payments),
external assistance (9.8% through UNRWA) and
PNGOs (14.5%). The governmental health insurance
scheme (GHI) is the main insurance scheme. Prior to
the establishment of the PA, enrolment was compul-
sory for public sector employees and their dependents.
Following 1994, an incremental extension of coverage
was achieved based on voluntary special contract for
firms’ employees and for the self-employed. Conse-
quently, enrolment in the GHI grew from 20% of the
total WB and GS population in 1993 to cover about
34% of the Palestinian population in 2000. The GHI
coverage includes in-patient and out-patient services
primarily provided at MoH institutions, with co-
payments paid for medications and some specified
services. While the GHI coverage entitles usually all
enrolees’ household members to public services,
contribution rules are, generally, applied to households
or families rather than individuals. Average monthly
premiums is about 7.4 USD; for public sector em-
ployees, it is a fixed percentage of 5% of basic salary
up to a ceiling of 17.3 USD; for firms’ employees
2311M. Abu-Zaineh et al. / Social Science & Medicine 66 (2008) 2308e2320and self-employed it is a lump-sum payment of 11.5
USD and 17.3 USD, respectively. Finally, premiums
of hardship cases are fully subsidized by the Ministry
of Social Welfare (MoH-PHIC, 2006).
Following the renewal of the second Palestinian
uprising (Intifada) in 2000, GHI has experienced
a further extension when the MoH started to offer
a very low-premium insurance e latterly known as
‘‘Al-Aqsa Coverage’’. Although the latter was largely
fuelled by the overwhelming need to promote equity
in the provision of health care through offering
a low-priced coverage to the mostly affected classes
of population (e.g., unemployed), the practice followed
latterly has made such coverage obtainable for high
proportions of households (30% of total population),
regardless of any income-related criteria. This
expanded coverage of GHI has not been associated
with a parallel improvement in the capacity of health
services, and consequently, led to a deterioration in
services including a lack of essential drugs and sup-
plies (Giacaman et al., 2003). Private health insurance
market, on the other hand, has expanded rapidly in the
past few years (Hamdan, Defever, & Abdeen, 2003).
However, especially, due to the relatively high pre-
miums (three times higher than GHI) private insurance
caters so far for a tiny proportion of population, and
represents less than 10% of the total health expenditure
in 2005. Lastly, it is noteworthy that the geographical
divisions aggravated by the political conditions of the
past years producing two separate de facto health
care systems in the WB and GS, motivates tackling
equity features associated with each system separately.
Methodology
Inequality measures
Analogous to a tax structure, RS measures the over-
all RE of a payment schedule over the entire income
range through comparing the Gini coefficients, GX
and GN, for pre-payment and post-payment income dis-
tributions, whereas KPI measures the extent to which
a payment schedule (T) departs from proportionality
(Kakwani, 1977) e proportionality being measured
against the distribution of pre-payment income (X) e
and involves comparing the concentration index of
payment, CT, with GX. Thus, for a given GX, the two
aggregate indices can then be assessed as:
RS¼ GX GN ð1Þ
KPI¼ CT GX ð2ÞA positive (negative) value of the indices indicates
a pro-poor and progressive (pro-rich and regressive)
structure, while a zero value indicates proportionality.
Accurate estimates of the indices are obtained using
the convenient (weighted) covariance method (cf. Ler-
man & Yitzhaki, 1989). While the two indices are
derived from the Lorenz curves and the associated con-
centration curves, one limitation of relying on their
aggregate single values lies in the fact that progressivity
(regressivity) prevailing in some parts of the distribu-
tion may not be significantly applicable to other parts
(Klavus, 2001). Another difficulty may arise when the
two underlying distributional curves cross, whereas
the observed single-value result is non-zero. This occurs
when inequalities favouring the poor (rich) in some part
are not exactly offset by inequalities favouring the rich
(poor) in the other part (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer,
1992). Consequently, inequality evidence based on the
single-valued summery index can provide imperfect
description of the nature of inequality prevailing in
the distribution. For these reasons, it is often useful to
conduct analysis at disaggregate level and perform sta-
tistical tests at certain ranges of the income distribution
rather than in the overall distribution. Therefore, we
deploy the disaggregate approach as used by Klavus
(2001). Specifically, we estimate the underlying distri-
butions of the above indices, LX, LN and LT for a set
of p-ordinates e where p is defined over the kth percen-
tile point (e.g.; 10th percentile), as follows:
REðpÞ ¼ LXðpÞ  LNðpÞ ð3Þ
VEðpÞ ¼ LXðpÞ  LTðpÞ ð4Þ
where LX(p) and LN(p) are the pre-payment and post-
payment income distributions, respectively, and repre-
senting the fractions of income received by pth
proportion of population before and after paying for
health care. Similarly, LT(p) is the concentration curve
for health care payments, and indicating the proportion
paid for health care by the pth proportion of population.
Each of which is being estimated for a set of p-ordinates.
Therefore, in the case of decile-ordinates, p takes the
values from 1 to 9. Such disaggregate approach shall
enable us to properly identify the prevailing inequalities
at various levels of the aggregation while testing for
differences in the ordinates of LX(p) and LN(p) and
LX(p) and LT(p). In the next section, we develop statisti-
cal inference using a bootstrap-based method for both
cases: redistribution and progressivity indices e i.e., at
the aggregate level e and for the differences in p-
ordinates corresponding to income deciles e i.e., at the
disaggregate level.
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Statistical significance of observed variations in the
computed values of each of the above measures was
tested using bootstrap (BTS) method. A standard
BTS procedure is conventionally undertaken by draw-
ing randomly with replacement R independent samples
of a size equal to the original sample size (i.e., m¼ n).
It assumes that the observed distribution is a ‘‘purely’’
random sample of the underlying population distribu-
tion and the observations are independent (Efron &
Tibshirani, 1993). Given that inequality measures are
non-linear functions of a random variable such as in-
come, the heavy-tailed income distributions, and the
fact that the sample may not be a ‘‘purely’’ random
of the underlying population distribution, applying
the standard BTS may fail to provide accurate infer-
ence for inequality measures e e.g., inconsistent stan-
dard error e and consequently, make conventional
hypothesis testing inappropriate (Davidson & Flach-
aire, 2007). In order to improve the reliability of
BTS inference we have opted to implement a non-
standard BTS using: the ‘‘m-out-of-n bootstrap
method’’ e a technique used to assess the reliability
of standard errors when a small number of extreme
values have an overwhelming influence on the behav-
iour of BTS distribution function, and involves evaluat-
ing the error in rejection probability (ERP) under
different choices of m, where m is the sub-sample
size and equals n in the standard BTS (Davidson &
Flachaire, 2007). Details of technical derivations can
be found in standard references such as Deaton
(1997), Horowitz (2000), and Shao and Tu (1995),
and recent applications are provided in Andres and
Calonge (2005) and Davidson and Flachaire (2007).
However, to illustrate the methods, we briefly point
to the implemented procedures for both cases: the
aggregate indices and p-ordinates.
Consider a statistic bI based on a sample of size n,
hence, instead of assuming the shape of the distribution
of bI statistic, the distribution of bI is approximated
through investigating its variation over a large number
of pseudo-samples obtained by randomly selecting,
with replacement, a large number (R) of sub-samples
of size m, out of the dataset e the BTS re-samples.
In case where the dataset is sampled based on multi-
stage designs, drawings can be made out of clusters.
This step was not followed in our procedure since
the necessary clusters sampling information was
not available. We have, however, corrected for
differences in sampling probability rather than the dif-
ferent types of the multi-stage sampling designs usedin the survey. This was completed using inflation tech-
nique (e.g., van Doorslaer & Koolman, 2004). The lat-
ter involves inflating the sample size by multiplying
the sampling weights by the inverse of the smallest
weight and rounded to the nearest integer. This culmi-
nated in an expanded sample from which our random
sub-samples have been drawn. The same statistic is
then computed for each BTS re-sample, yielding bI e
the replication of the statistic bI. The sampling variation
of bI can be estimated by applying the expression of
standard errors to the R-length vector of bootstrap
method replications. Regarding the estimation of prob-
ability confidence intervals, BTS provides us with dif-
ferent possible methods to construct tail probabilities
for the statistic bI, e.g., the percentile method (Mills &
Zandvakili, 1997). The latter procedure involves an
estimation of an empirical function of bI from the R
re-samples, which culminates in the estimation of
appropriate confidence intervals.
Since our distributions are obtained from the same
sample, comparing the two Lorenz curves, LX and
LN, or LX with the concentration curve (LT), involves
different BTS testing procedure than comparing two
independently distributed curves obtained from sepa-
rate samples. Testing for the former relationship re-
quires the joint composition of the two distributions;
the observed data in such a case {(X1, Y1), ., (Xn,
Yn)} are drawn from the joint sampling distribution
in which each observation consists of a vector of two
components, e.g., pre-payment and post-payment in-
comes measured for the same household in a particular
year; whereas in the latter case, the test can be com-
pleted based on the separate distributions (X1, .,
Xn), (Y1,., Yn) of the independent samples. Thus,
the following BTS testing procedures can be adapted
for each case. Let V1 and V2 be two vectors represent-
ing the bootstrap method values of pre-payment and
post-payment incomes, and let the hypothesis testing
be H0: I1¼ I2 against H0: I1s I2, or equivalently, H0:
D¼ 0 against HA: Ds 0 e where D¼ V2 V1. In
the case of independent samples the BTS testing proce-
dures can be conducted by first obtaining the difference
statistics bD ¼ bI2 bI1, and then BTS re-sampling can
be obtained separately from each sample. In the case
of dependent distributions (our case) the joint distribu-
tion should be re-sampled as a whole. Thus, instead of
separately bootstrapping V1 and V2, we have bootstrap-
ped D, such that each pair of observations belonging to
the same individual is treated as a block. The BTS
probability intervals are then computed based on the
empirical distribution of the statistic bD, which is ob-
tained by fixing R at 1000 simulated samples of size
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tivity of ERP under different choices of m (Davidson
& Flachaire, 2007). Lastly, it should be noted that test-
ing for dominance relations at the disaggregate level
requires different hypothesis procedure than testing
for inequality at the aggregate level. This is because
the latter involves testing for a vector of p-ordinates e
i.e., a multiple testing context e while the former case
involves testing for a single value. For testing hypo-
thesis concerning the dominance relations as they
correspond to a set of p-ordinates e where p is defined
over the kth percentile pointe the testing procedure
requires, first, computing the estimated differences be-
tween the two curves, evaluated over the p-ordinates.
Thus, bDðpiÞ; i ¼ 1;.; k and the hypothesis to be
tested in this case is defined as:
H0 :W
k
i¼1
bDðpiÞ ¼ 0

against HA :X
k
i¼1
bDðpiÞs0

where bDðpiÞ represent the differences between the two
curves for each i; i taking the values from 1 to 9 in
the case of deciles. If bDðpiÞ are presented graphically
on the y-axis, along with their corresponding bootstrap
method confidence intervals, against the corresponding
p-ordinates, the dominance test rejects the null hypoth-
esis should the BTS confidence intervals, evaluated
over p-ordinates, do not cross the abscissa-axis.
Data and variable definitions
Our analysis is based on data taken from the 2004
Household Health Expenditure Survey (HHES) under-
taken by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
(PCBS). A two-stage cluster random sample was
used to select 4499 households of which 3826 house-
holds were interviewed: 2504 in the WB and 1322 in
GS. The data were weighted as per the Population Cen-
sus of 1997. The latter represents the first census of
population in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and
on which a set of representative enumeration areas
were identified e these were updated in 2003. The
HHES-2004 contains information about household’s
socio-demographic characteristics, gross monthly in-
come and expenditures. Concerning health care expen-
ditures, information was gathered based on two
approaches. A utilization approach in which data on
only four types of expenditures were estimated based
on individuals’ utilization patterns. In addition to a direct
expenditure approach in which data on household total
health care expenditures were approximated on a refer-
ence period of one month, using a list of questions track-
ing all potential types of expenditures incurred by allhouseholds’ members. These include doctors’ consulta-
tion fees, hospitalization costs, laboratory tests, medica-
tions, and transportation costs, and so on up to 25
separate items.
Payments were computed for three modes of financ-
ing: out-of-pocket payments, GHI, and private health
insurance; and using the second source of information.
This was preferred on the grounds that although it is
likely to suffer from eventual bias, it can still better
reflect the actual burden of payments. This is because
asking each household to fill up a list containing
a wide range of items can help minimize the recall er-
ror. In addition, using the same reference period upon
which these items were recorded can help avoid varia-
tions in payments due to the variable recall periods
(Wagstaff et al., 1999). Therefore, total health expendi-
tures born by the household (net of reimbursement if
any) were converted to annual basis based on summing
up pro rata expenditures in the various categories and
scaling up to 12 months. Lastly, regarding GHI and pri-
vate insurance premiums, they represent contributions
born by households and were obtained directly from
the survey.
On the other hand, since data on household expen-
ditures are commonly advocated, relative to data on in-
come, as a more accurate measure of households’
living standards in the context of developing countries
(Deaton & Grosh, 2000), pre-payment income variable
is apprehended through household expenditures e
gross of health care expenditures. Post-payment
income is then estimated as pre-payment income net
of health care expenditures. Household income and
health care payments were equivalised to generate an
average income per equivalent-adult, using WHO/
FAO equivalence scale proposed for developing
countries (e.g., Cisse´ et al., 2007; Deaton & Grosh,
2000).
Results
The aggregate summary index approach
Estimates of the aggregate inequality indices associ-
ated with each, and all, source(s) of health care financ-
ing are presented in Table 1 e along with the
corresponding values of BTS standard errors and 95%
BTS confidence intervals. It is of interest to note, first,
that the estimated values of BTS standard errors are
quite small compared to estimated coefficients, indicat-
ing a good precision in the results. As shown in Table 1,
out-of-pocket payments tend to increase overall in-
equality in income distribution, with GN equal 0.48
Table 1
Overall redistributive effect and progressivity indices of health care financing in the West Bank (WB) and Gaza Strip (GS)a
Region Index Pre-payment
income
Out-of-pocket
payments
Governmental
health
insurance
Private health
insurance
Total payments
Reynolds-Smolensky index of redistribution (RS)
WB GX or GN 0.4463 (0.0074)
[0.4339, 0.4601]
0.4832 (0.0078)
[0.566, 0.690]
0.4456 (0.0074)
[0.4303, 0.4594]
0.4462 (0.0068)
[0.4321, 0.4606]
0.4842 (0.0079)
[0.4695, 0.5006]
RS 0.0370 (0.0026)
[0.0417, 0.0313]
0.0007 (0.0004)
[0.0001, 0.0016]
0.0001 (0.0001)
[0.0014, 0.0004]
0.0379 (0.0028)
[0.0430, 0.0327]
GS GX or GN 0.4124 (0.0108)
[0.3877, 0.4211]
0.4371 (0.0110)
[0.4248, 0.4597]
0.4117 (0.0110)
[0.3879, 0.4321]
0.4122 (0.0109)
[0.3887, 0.4326]
0.4377 (0.0116)
[0.4316, 0.4602]
RS 0.0247 (0.0038)
[0.0321, 0.0178]
0.0007 (0.0004)
[0.0001, 0.0016]
0.0001 (0.0001)
[0.00004, 0.0003]
0.0254 (0.0037)
[0.0323, 0.0182]
Kakwani index of progressivity (KPI)
WB GX or CT 0.4463 (0.0074)
[0.4339, 0.4601]
0.3633 (0.0160)
[0.3321, 0.3933]
0.5076 (0.0207)
[0.4330, 0.5452]
0.5558 (0.0784)
[0.3814, 0.6764]
0.3786 (0.0138)
[0.3542, 0.4066]
KPI 0.0830 (0.0149)
[0.1133, 0.0554]
0.0603 (0.0193)
[0.0190, 0.0976]
0.1095 (0.0779)
[0.0609, 0.2304]
0.0677 (0.0137)
[0.0906, 0.0425]
GS GX or CT 0.4124 (0.0108)
[0.3877, 0.4211]
0.3488 (0.0322)
[0.2863, 0.3643]
0.4648 (0.0204)
[0.4215, 0.4989]
0.5790 (0.0950)
[0.3793, 0.7339]
0.3651 (0.0252)
[0.3126, 0.4108]
KPI 0.0636 (0.0301)
[0.1200, 0.0078]
0.0524 (0.0192)
[0.0119, 0.0895]
0.1666 (0.0935)
[0.0315, 0.3270]
0.0473 (0.0228)
[0.0939, 0.0050]
a Bootstrap standard errors of the estimate are in parenthesis; the 95% bootstrap confidence intervals of the estimate are in the square brackets.
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tically significantly different from GX at a significance
level of 0.05. This resulted in a significant negative
value of RS, clearly indicating a ‘‘pro-rich’’ out-of-
pocket financing arrangement. This was slightly more
pronounced in the case of the WB (RS¼0.0370)
compared to GS (RS¼0.0247). By contrast, GHI
and private insurance schemes appear to be ‘‘pro-
poor’’ in their RE, as represented by the positive values
of RS for the WB and GS. Table 1 shows, however, that
the positive RE associated with the two insurance
schemes, in the WB and GS, are both marginal
(RS¼ 0.0007 and 0.0001 for GHI and private insur-
ance, respectively) and statistically insignificant (at
a¼ 0.05). Results such as these seem to reflect, in
part, the relatively low shares of the public and private
insurance schemes in the overall financing burden in the
two Palestinian regions. Some, though, is undoubtedly
due to the fact that converge is not universal, and hence,
the RE associated with the insurance schemes are likely
to be driven by variations in coverage across income
groups as well as the diversity of institutional arrange-
ments and the associated premiums e consequences of
each of which will be further discussed in the next sec-
tion. Suffice to note here that RS for the overall health
care burden remains, consequently, significantly nega-
tive, indicating a detrimental RE against the poorest
sections of the population e with relatively highernegative values (RS¼0.0379 and 0.0254 for WB
and GS, respectively) compared with out-of-pocket
payments when assessed separately. This indicates
that health care financing burden, overall, induces fur-
ther income-reranking in the post-payment income pe-
riod relative to pre-payment income period.
Results on VE of the three financing sources e as
captured by KPI, offer some insights about the aggre-
gate deviation from proportionality in the payments
structure of each of which with respect to GX. In the
case of out-of-pocket source of financing, the value
of concentration index of payment for health care
(CT) appears to be far inferior and significantly differ-
ent from GX in the two regions. This resulted in a sig-
nificant negative value of KPI at a significance level of
0.05, clearly indicating a regressive out-of-pocket
financing arrangement. The extent of regressivity in
households’ out-of-pocket payments in the WB
emerges to be more pronounced (KPI¼0.0830)
than in GS (KPI¼0.0636). By contrast, the values
of CT for both the GHI and private insurance schemes,
although appear to be far superior to GX, differences
between the two indices (CT and GX) are found to be
statistically insignificant (at a¼ 0.05), and resulted in
non-significant positive values of KPI. Total health
care payments, borne by the Palestinian households,
overall, remain, as a result, regressive with a KPI of
0.0677 in the WB and 0.0473 in GS e both
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be noted that there is some variation in the extent of
overall regressivity for the total payments compared
to regressivity of out-of-pocket payments per se. Con-
sidered jointly, the overall regressivity indices in the
two regions turned out to be somewhat less exacerbated
in magnitude. This may indicate that some progressiv-
ity in insurance contributions has partially compensated
for regressivity found in out-of-pocket payments. How-
ever, given the dominante role of the latter in the overall
financing-mix and the insignificant progressivity we
found in insurance schemes, the overall regressivity
observed did not change to any great extent.a
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In this section, the Lorenz and concentration curves
are evaluated throughout income p-ordinates, using the
dominance criterion. The analysis yields RE(p) and
VE(p), which represent the differences in cumulative
shares of: pre-payment income and, respectively,
post-payment income and health care payments as
per each decile. Results are presented in Figs. 1 and
2 where RE(p) and VE(p) are plotted against the dec-
ile-ordinates. The corresponding BTS confidence inter-
vals at a significance level of 95% are presented as
intersecting lines at the ordinates of each decile.Out-of-pocket payments–Gaza Strip
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pocket payments are significantly negative (at
a¼ 0.05) in the WB and GS, at all income deciles, in-
dicating that out-of-pocket payments are ‘‘pro-rich’’
regardless of income decile. As for GHI, the results
indicate that LN(p) dominates LX(p) at all income
deciles indicating a ‘‘pro-poor’’ trend; however, the
differences between LX(p) and LN (p) are only statisti-
cally significant (at a¼ 0.05) at the sixth and higher
deciles. Turning to private insurance, none of the
differences between the Lorenz curves were significant
(at a¼ 0.05) at any of the decile-ordinates. Similar
results are obtained for the case of the WB and GS.Out-of-pocket payments–West Bank
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Fig. 2. Progressivity of health care financing (withResults concerning VE, as presented in Fig. 2, show
the differences between LX (p) and LT (p) for the three
health care financing sources. Fig. 2a, b suggests that
out-of-pocket payments are regressive (at a¼ 0.05),
at all income deciles in the WB and GS. On the other
hand, GHI and private insurance premiums seemed to
be progressive for all income deciles in the WB and
GS (Fig. 2cef). However, such result was only signif-
icant for the four highest income deciles in the case of
GHI. In the case of private insurance, although all
VE(p) are found to be positive, none of the
differences are significant at a¼ 0.05 in the WB and
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This paper seeks to extend the distributional analysis
of health care financing beyond the commonly used ag-
gregate approach, to implement a disaggregate method
that splits up summary measures over specific income
groups. Therefore, instead of merely relying on sum-
mary indices, the analysis considered RE and VE distri-
butions over constituent parts of income distribution,
using the dominance criterion. In addition, statistical
inference was apprehended using the bootstrap method.
The analysis was conducted for alternative health care
financing schemes proper to the Palestinian context.
Results clearly suggest that although both the aggregate
and disaggregate approaches identify similar trends, the
latter offers more subtle diagnoses necessary to inform
relevant and more ‘‘equitable’’ public policies.
Both the aggregate and disaggregate approaches for
measurement of inequalities conclude that out-of-
pocket payments e which constitute a major source
of health care financing in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory (z40% of total health expenditures) e play
in favour of the rich, and increase pre-existing income
inequalities. The disaggregate analysis however
stresses the high burden of health care expenditures
among the most economically worse-off classes of
the population, calling for a critical need to reconsider
the prevailing financing-mix. Indeed, the current struc-
ture of out-of-pocket payments in the Occupied Pales-
tinian Territory is a rigid one, with generally no
mentioned price discrimination to account for individ-
uals’ contributive capacities. This is particularly pro-
nounced in the case of the private sector, which plays
a non-negligible role in health care provision (around
21.4% of health care visits take place at health institu-
tions belonging to the private sector). Recently a user-
fees exemption policy was advocated in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory e following recommendations
from elsewhere; e.g., see (Wagstaff, 2002) e to allevi-
ate the burden on families in hardship situation.
Indeed, it is well-established that introducing exemp-
tions can enhance progressivity, should those being ex-
empted be concentrated in lower income deciles. The
system was however not strictly well-administered,
nor properly followed up, in a way that it paradoxically
culminated into deteriorating the quality of provided
care (due to inflation in the number of insured individ-
uals), and compromised the financial self-sufficiency in
the system, without significantly limiting persisting
inequalities.
It is increasingly argued that in the context of devel-
oping countries, more equitable financing could beacquired by a shift toward pre-payment schemes. A
growing body of literature has brought evidence in
favour of ex-ante modes of financing on the grounds
that, beside its intrinsic risk-pooling characteristic,
pre-payment schemes can be more easily designed to
take into account individuals’ ATP (Asfaw & Braun,
2004). Health insurance schemes in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory e both public and private e
though appear to have potential equalizing effects
over the entire income distribution, their progressive
feature was not found to be statistically significant at
the aggregate level. Interestingly, when the analysis
was conducted at the decile-level, results indicated
a significant pro-poor characteristic of GHI over half
of the deciles (the upper half). Such findings shall
help inform appropriate health policies with regard to
the payment structure to adopt, and the category of
population to cover. More specific results with this
regard could be obtained following a simulation exer-
cise that assesses the impact of structural and organiza-
tional factors on the performance of the system e this
is being attempted elsewhere (Abu-Zaineh, Mataria,
Luchini, & Moatti, submitted for publication). The in-
significant results at low-income levels might be due to
the disconnection between insurance premiums and in-
dividuals’ ATP, with the use of a ceiling for obligatory
affiliations (17.3 USD per household per month) and
a fixed lump-sum for voluntary affiliation e both mea-
sures constituting regressive elements that limit the
positive equalizing effects of insurance schemes (Wag-
staff & van Doorslaer, 1997). Moreover, exemptions
through the so-called Al-Aqsa Coverage are practically
not necessarily income-based.
An alternative financing mechanism to the ex-ante
insurance schemes consists of payments at the point
of consumption through user fees. However, given
that ex-post payments are subject to the unpredictabil-
ity of illness, and are generally unconnected to individ-
uals’ ATP, user-fees are seen regressive by definition,
should they be the same for all users. It has been sug-
gested that implementing a policy of price discrimina-
tion could culminate into a more equitable user-fees
structure (Moony, 2000). Techniques for differentiating
contributions to account for users’ respective prefer-
ences and ATP have been extensively discussed in
the economic literature and recently applied to the
specific case of health (e.g., Mataria, Donaldson,
Luchini, & Moatti, 2004). Accordingly, a pricing struc-
ture should depend not only on individuals’ ATP but
also on their preferences vis-a`-vis the provided care,
which could be informed by an elicitation of individ-
uals’ willingness to pay values.
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ling prices e especially those practiced in the private
sector e and directing foreign assistance toward ser-
vices that are mostly needed by the poor, could also
be of help in alleviating prevalent regressivity. For in-
stance, the cost of medications and doctors’ tariffs are
found to absorb the biggest shares of health care ex-
penditures, and might be key factors behind the regres-
sivity. Subsidizing the former and regulating the latter,
as long as the poor are concerned, should be helpful.
The disaggregate approach was able to illuminate
potential differences among different subgroups of
the population. In effect, while the analysis at the
aggregate level revealed insignificant GHI redistribu-
tive and vertical effects, the disaggregate approach
demonstrated significant positive effects for the five
highest income deciles of the population. This suggests
that, in spite of the above mentioned limitations e e.g.,
ceiling and lump-sum payments e financial premiums
paid by GHI affiliates belonging to middle and upper
income deciles tend to be significantly positively
related to their ATP. This indicates that specific sub-
groups, e.g. income deciles, might demonstrate fea-
tures that would in effect be concealed by overall
aggregate estimates. The insignificant positive effects
observed at low-income deciles may be due, in part,
to the poor design of insurance scheme where
premiums are not properly linked to individuals’ ATP
at these levels. In addition, this may be also due to
the extensive exemptions, and the low-cost insurance,
provided through ‘‘Al-Aqsa Coverage’’, where high
percentages of households end up with a quasi free
coverage. Such observations indicate the feeble role
of the available exemption and pricing policies in
promoting progressivity, and hence, signal the utmost
need to reconsider the current structure of GHI scheme
in order to strengthen its progressive intrinsic capac-
ities as an equitable health care financing scheme.
Although the analysis undertaken in this study
attempted to use recent methodological developments
in the field of inequality measurement, some practical
limitations that might have influenced the study results
are worth mentioning. Firstly, the absence of reliable
data on taxes has made impossible to estimate the
amount that would have been paid through taxation
for health care in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
Including such data offers the opportunity to assess eq-
uity implications of overall health care financing. How-
ever, it must be noted that the particular context of the
Occupied Palestinian Territory lacks a proper system
of tax-transfer. In addition, given the chronic political
crises in the region, that has considerably increasedthe proportion of the population living under the pov-
erty (PCBS, 2006b), and compromised the perfor-
mance of the local economy, the level of general
taxation remains low. Therefore, even if the higher in-
come groups have additionally contributed to health
care through the share of their taxes that the govern-
ment allocates to the public health sector, it remains
however unlikely that this contribution reverses our di-
agnosis of regressivity.
Secondly, as in similar studies on inequality mea-
surement in health care, our estimates concerning the
direct out-of-pocket payments were based on survey
data, and therefore, they may be subject to potential
biases related to the particular nature of such source
of financing. As indicated above, our analysis has
made use of data derived based on the same reference
period for all expenditure categories. Although, the lat-
ter e compared to a scenario where different recall
periods are used e help minimize recall bias, data col-
lected over a short period may be subject to ‘‘eventual
bias’’ due to the stochastic and seasonal nature of
illnesses and the infrequency with which some health
care payments are made (Wagstaff, O’Donnell, &
van Doorslaer, 2007). Annualising out-of-pocket pay-
ments in the presence of seasonality, by multiplying
with some scaling factor might be associated with
over-estimations or under-estimations of total health
expenditures. This may be avoided in future studies,
should health expenditure information be collected
over a longer period of time, and using a diary
approach. Lastly, it is worth noting that such direct
measure of health care expenditures ignores some indi-
rect costs, e.g., opportunity cost of time and the loss of
income related to the time households’ members spend
to seek care e which are shown to be higher at higher
income levels (Cisse´ et al., 2007). Considering such
indirect costs e e.g., differences in waiting time at
private-for-profit versus private-not-for-profit e allows
assessing the extent to which price-quality differentials
affect the magnitude of regressivity. Unfortunately, our
survey did not offer data on waiting time, and in its
absence it was impossible to incorporate such costs
into our measure of total heath care expenditures.
Conclusions
Several dimensions have to be taken into account
with regard to the feasibility and impact of any changes
in the current financing-mix for health care in Palestine.
The special context of the Occupied Palestinian Terri-
tory is characterized by an underdeveloped fiscal and
managerial systems, extreme reliance on international
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occupation. All these factors have created conditions
for an absence of coherent policy, and an accumulation
of ad hoc operational plans driven by historical inertia
with concentration on emergency agenda e something
that might attest being irrational at many instances
(Giacaman et al., 2003). This should indicate the diffi-
culties to be encountered if a change in the prevailing
financing-mix e even a positive one e is attempted.
In spite of their limitations, the results presented in
this paper should however help shape the policy toward
building an equitable health care financing system for
the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Given the high
share of households income absorbed by out-of-pocket
payments, and hence, the pronounced adverse effect of
such financing modality on the already unbalanced in-
come distribution, a need is there to identify innovative
financing mechanisms capable to reduce the financial
burden of health care and to limit existing regressivity.
Although proven to be promising, the current structure
of the Governmental Health Insurance scheme needs to
be reconsidered to further enhance its positive intrinsic
capacities. Given that the governmental insurance
scheme appears to be significantly progressive for
only the highest income deciles, a reconsideration of
the unplanned extension of governmental insurance
coverage through the so-called Al-Aqsa Coverage is
needed. In addition, although private health insurance
schemes are still limited, it was found that such financ-
ing modality may play some positive role in the reduc-
tion of the regressivity associated with ex-post
payments, should enrolment’s premiums be suitably
linked to households’ abilities-to-pay.
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